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Abstract
Cryptanalysis of the Purple Cipher using Random Restarts
by Aparna Shikhare
Cryptanalysis is the process of trying to analyze ciphers, cipher text, and crypto
systems, which may exploit any loopholes or weaknesses in the systems, leading us to an
understanding of the key used to encrypt the data.
This project uses Expectation Maximization (EM) approach using numerous restarts
to attack decipherment problems such as the Purple Cipher. In this research, we perform
cryptanalysis of the Purple cipher using genetic algorithms and hidden Markov models
(HMM). If the Purple cipher has a fixed plugboard, we show that genetic algorithms are
successful in retrieving the plaintext from cipher text with high accuracy. On the other
hand, if the cipher has a plugboard that is not fixed, we can decrypt the cipher text with
increasing accuracy given an increase in population size and restarts. We performed the
cryptanalysis of PseudoPurple, which is less complex but more powerful than Purple using
HMMs. Though we could not decrypt cipher text produced by PseudoPurple with good
accuracy, there is an increase in accuracy of the decrypted plaintext with an increase in
the number of restarts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Purple machine was a complex machine used to encrypt data not only in the
1930s, but even today. It falls under the category of homophonic substitution ciphers. A
homophonic substitution cipher is a substitution cipher where a single plaintext letter
can be replaced by any of the different cipher text letters. The Purple machine could
essentially replace a single letter with a series of letters of hundreds of thousands in length
before it would start repeating the same substitution of letters. Purple was a diplomatic
cryptographic machine used by the Japanese Foreign office, just before and during World
War II. The machine is an electromechanical stepping switch device, which has mainly
three major components [7]. First, the electric typewriter is used to input information to
the machine. The second part is a ‘‘cryptographic assembly” that consists of a plug board,
four electric coding rings, and numerous wires and switches, which map the plaintext
letter to various letters to produce the final cipher text character. The last part is an
output unit that prints the encrypted message from the machine [8].
In this project, we propose to decipher the homophonic substitution cipher such as the
Purple cipher using two approaches. The first approach is using genetic algorithms and
the second approach is hidden Markov models (HMM).
Genetic algorithms are metaheuristics that use the principles of biology to search
through the candidates and find a solution to the optimization and search problems [5].
It is inspired by natural evolution and uses techniques such as inheritance, mutation,
selection, and crossover. A hidden Markov model is a Markov model that has hidden
(unobserved) states. In HMMs, the state is not directly visible, but a series of tokens or
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observations, which indicate certain information about the states, are visible. The states
are related to the observations with discrete probability distributions.
We used genetic algorithms to decrypt the cipher text produced by Purple with a
fixed plugboard. We could successfully decipher Purple with 100% accuracy. We also
performed cryptanalysis on Purple without a fixed plugboard. With this, we saw that
the accuracy of the decrypted plaintext improves with an increase in population size and
number of restarts.
PseudoPurple is similar to Purple, except for the sixes-twenties split. That is, the
plugboard is not partitioned into sixes and twenties. This makes PseudoPurple very
powerful in terms of the effort required to brute-force the cipher. However, since there
is no split of the plugboard into sixes and twenties, it is very straightforward and less
complex in terms of its operation and configuration. Due to its simplicity, we used HMMs
to obtain plaintext from cipher text. Though the accuracy is low, the result improves
with an increase in the number of random restarts.
The report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we talk about the basics of cryptography
and different types of ciphers. We briefly explain the significance of Purple in World War
II. Then, we give details of its configuration and implementation. After this, we look at a
slightly different model of Purple called PseudoPurple. We also discuss the background of
genetic algorithms and hidden Markov models. In Chapter 3 we discuss cryptanalysis of
Purple with genetic algorithms and also outline the results obtained from it. In Chapter 4
we describe HMM approach to decipher the cipher text produced by PseudoPurple. We
summarize the results obtained from this approach as well. In Chapter 5 we conclude the
report followed by future work and enhancements in Chapter 6.
2
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Basics of Cryptography
2.1.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the conversion of the text in readable form (called the plaintext) from
the sender’s side into an unintelligible form (called the cipher text) to the receiver’s side.
This is done when the message is sensitive and should be kept a secret in the presence of
third parties. Cryptography allows us to store or send sensitive data over insecure networks
so that they cannot be read by anyone except the intended recipient. The cryptographic
algorithm is a mathematical function used to encrypt the plaintext and decrypt the cipher
text in combination with the key [9]. The same plaintext can be encrypted to different
cipher text with different keys. The key is the variable that is provided as an input to
the cryptographic algorithm. The key remains private and ensures secure communication.
The security of the entire cryptographic scheme depends on the security of the key.
2.1.2 Cryptanalysis
Cryptography basically deals with securing of data, whereas cryptanalysis tries to
break the cipher used for securing data. This requires studying and analyzing the cipher
to discover any hidden aspects with a view of finding some weakness that can be exploited
in order to break the message.
The ciphers can be broadly classified into two types:
1. Simple Substitution Ciphers
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2. Homophonic Substitution Ciphers
In the next two sections, we will be explain the two types of ciphers in detail.
2.1.3 Simple Substitution Ciphers
The simple substitution cipher is where every plaintext character is replaced by a
different cipher text character. It is very different from the Caesar cipher where the
plaintext characters are just shifted by a number (key) [10]. The simple substitution
cipher offers very little security and is easy to break. There is basically one to one mapping
between the plaintext and the cipher text characters.
An example of simple substitution cipher is:
Plain alphabet abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
Key bhqgismeaylonfdxjkrcvutzwp
Suppose the plaintext is ‘‘alice in wonderland’’, on encrypting this plaintext with the given
key we get the following cipher text.
Plaintext aliceinwonderland
Ciphertext boaqiafudfgikobfg
2.1.4 Homophonic Substitution Ciphers
The homophonic substitution cipher is different from simple substitution cipher, in that
a single plaintext letter can be encrypted by any of the different cipher text letters [11].
There are generally more difficult to break than the simple substitution ciphers. The
English alphabet letter frequency count method can be used to break simple substitution
ciphers, but the same technique cannot be used to perform the cryptanalysis of homophonic
substitution ciphers. The usual method used to break homophonic substitution ciphers
are hill climb techniques.
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2.2 Historical Significance of Purple
In the early 1930s, the Japanese government purchased the commercial version of the
Enigma machine from the German government in order to build an enhanced version of
it. The Japanese government modified the Enigma machine to add more security. This
cryptographic machine was named ‘‘Red” by the US government. This machine was one
of the most secure and evolved cryptographic machines in the world. It was used by the
Japanese government from 1931 to 1936 [7], but later the US Signal Intelligence Service
broke the cipher. However, US could not keep the decryption of Red very secret and this
made the Japanese government suspicious.
Soon after the ‘‘Red” cipher was broken, the Japanese government created a more
evolved and secure cipher known as ‘‘97-shiki O-bun In-ji-ki” or ‘‘97 Alphabetical Type-
writer”, named for its creation on the Japanese year 2597 in 1937 [1]. The US later named
it as Purple. Unlike the Enigma machine, which used the blinking lights to represent the
message, Purple used an electric typewriter, which could write the message on paper [1].
This was easy to use when compared to the Enigma machine. However, it was very bulky
and heavy, due to this the Purple machine was tedious to carry in combat areas.
Figure 2.1: Purple machine used by Japanese government [1]
The Purple machine was used to send sensitive messages to diplomats and military
officials in many places including Washington, Berlin, and London [1]. It was one of the
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most complex and well developed ciphers used during that time. Though it was eventually
broken by the US government, it was used to send secret messages for over two years
during World War II. It required a huge amount of effort to break this cipher by US
cryptanalysts. Once Purple was broken, the US government used this against the Japanese
government to keep track of their activities. The US government never revealed to the
Japanese government that Purple was broken and tried to keep this a secret, so that
the Japanese would continue to send secret messages and this could reveal their plans of
attack. On June 1942, the Japanese government sent a secret message revealing their plan
of attack on Midway. A small number of Japanese soldiers were to attack nearby islands
to distract the allied troops who were positioned at Midway. The US intercepted this
message and learned about this secret attack by decrypting the message and warned the
allied troops about this. In order to avoid suspicion that Purple was broken, the troops
pretended to move away from Midway but as the Japanese soldiers came to attack, the
allied troops turned around and initiated a surprise assault [12]. The US was able to stop
Japan from taking over Midway island. The US used the advantage of being able to read
encrypted messages to reveal their plans of attack on Pearl Harbor [1].
2.3 Purple Cipher
2.3.1 The Purple Machine
The Purple machine is made of three major components. The first part is an electric
typewriter, which is used to input information to the machine.
The second part is a ‘‘cryptographic assembly”, which consists of plug boards, four
electric coding rings, and numerous wires and switches, which map the plaintext letter to
various letters to produce the final cipher text character. The Purple machine consists
of four switches: a sixes switch and three twenties switches. The sixes switch is used
to permute 6 letters from the English alphabet and the twenties switches are used to
permute the remaining 20 letters of the English alphabet, as shown in Figure 2.2. Each
switch has 25 hardwired unrelated permutations. The sixes switch steps for each character,
6
whereas the twenties switches step depending on the position of the other switch positions
(fastSwitch, middleSwitch, slowSwitch).
The last part is an output unit that prints the encrypted message from the machine [8] .
In order to decrypt the cipher text, the Purple machine needs to be set up with the
exact same configuration as it is used to encrypt the plaintext. Then, the cipher text
needs to be input through input typewriter and plaintext would be received from output
typewriter [7] .
Figure 2.2: Purple machine (S-sixes switch, L-M-R - twenties switch) [2]
2.3.2 Components of the Purple Machine
The cryptographic elements of the Purple machine are an input plugboard, switches to
permute the text, and the output plugboard [8]. Theoretically, the two plugboards can be
connected independently of each other, but in reality the Japanese government kept the
two plugboard settings identical [8].
The two plugboards are divided into two sets of characters: the sixes, which contains 6
letters from the English alphabet, and the twenties, which contain the remaining 20 letters
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of the English alphabet. The two internal plugboards (sixes and twenties) are connected
to external plugboards (sixes and twenties) that are used by typists. The external sixes
portion is matched with internal plugboard’s sixes and similarly external twenties portion is
matched with internal plugboard’s twenties. The external alphabets can be a permutation
of the English alphabet agreed by both parties, in advance. Following is an example
connection of external alphabets to the internal plugboard setting.
Sixes Twenties
Internal plugboard alphabet: AEIOUY BCDFGHJKLMNPQRSTVWXZ
External alphabet: NOKTYU XEQLHBRMPDICJASVWGZF
Figure 2.3: Mapping sixes from external keyboard to internal plugboard [3]
The sixes portion of the plugboard is connected to only one stepping switch. This
switch decides the characters from the external plugboard that will be mapped to the
characters from the internal plugboard. The six characters on the internal plugboard
do not vary and are fixed. The switch can be used to have 25 mappings between the
characters out of 6!, that is 720 different possibilities [3]. Each letter uses a different
mapping because of the switch that steps for each character of the plaintext. Thus, 25
different mappings can be used for encryption of sixes portion.
The twenties portion of the plugboard is connected to three different switches. These
three switches decide the twenty characters from the external plugboard that will be
mapped to the twenty characters from the internal plugboard. Each of the three switches
can be used for 25 different permutations of characters out of 20! total possibilities [3].
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Figure 2.4: Mapping twenties from external keyboard to internal plugboard [3]
Therefore, the period length of this mapping sequence is 25x25x25 = 15,625. Along with
these three switches, a concept of movement rules is also incorporated to make it more
complex and secure. The motion rules such as ‘‘fast”, ‘‘middle”, and ‘‘slow” are assigned
to each of the three switches. This adds an additional complexity of 6 possible switch
motions.
The internal configuration and components are hardwired and cannot be changed.
In order to understand the internal workings of Purple’s encryption and decryption,
one needs to understand the stepping of the switches. As mentioned earlier, there are
two types of switches, one sixes switch and three twenties switches. For all the switches,
when they reach their 25th position, they will rotate back to the 1st position on their next
advancement and the routine goes on. The sixes switch steps for each character, therefore
it repeats itself after encipherment of 25 characters.
However, there are certain rules or conditions that govern the stepping of the twenties
switches. One of the twenties switches is labeled as ‘‘fast”, another one as ‘‘middle”, and
the last one as ‘‘slow”. One of these switches steps for each character. Normally, the ‘‘fast”
steps to its next position with two exceptions, which occur when the sixes switch reaches
the 24th or 25th position. When the sixes switch moves to its 24th position (mapping), if
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the twenties ‘‘middle” switch is positioned at its 25th mapping, the ‘‘slow” switch steps to
next mapping [3]. Also, when the sixes switch is in its 25th position, the ‘‘middle” switch
will advance. Here is the sample of how the internal stepping switches work:
Switches Position
Sixes TwentiesOne TwentiesTwo TwentiesThree
21 1 25 5
22 2 25 5
23 3 25 5
24 4 25 5
25 4 25 6
1 4 1 6
2 5 1 6
Table 2.1: Sample switch position One:fast, Two:middle, Three:slow [3]
The encryption process has 3 basic steps. First, the character entered or input, C1
is seen to identify if it belongs to sixes or twenties. Then C1 is permuted to another
character C2 based on the input plugboard and external alphabet. If it belongs to the
sixes, then the character C2 is encrypted to another character C3 by the sixes switch. The
sixes switch advances to the next position for each character entered.
If the character entered belongs to the twenties portion, then it is encrypted thrice,
once each by twentiesOne, twentiesTwo, and TwentiesThree switches sequentially (the
decipher process is reversed; that is the letter will be permuted in the order: 3rd, 2nd,
and 1st switch). Character C3 will be obtained after this step. Third, C3 is now taken to
the external plugboard and permuted with same settings as the internal plugboard. The
final character is displayed in the output device [3].
2.3.3 An example illustrating Purple’s Encipherment
Consider the plain text ‘‘IT TAKES COURAGE TO ADMIT FEAR’’ with the follow-
ing configuration:
The permutations are cited in the Appendix A.
Initial sixes switch position: 3
Initial twenties switches position: 5, 8, 6 (1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively).
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Twenties switches motion: 1, 2, 3 (fast, middle, and slow, respectively)
Sixes Twenties
Alphabet: NAGVPQ OEFKUHCRYWSMIZJDXBLT
Plugboard: AEIOUY BCDFGHJKLMNPQRSTVWXZ
Table 2.2 shows the encryption of plaintext using the mentioned switch positions for sixes
and twenties. The cipher text is: ‘‘MYFNYOTZBZSAVCMIADUBXOYNX”
Plaintext
letter
Input
Plugboard
Sixes
Switch
TwentiesOne
Switch
TwentiesTwo
Switch
TwentiesThree
Switch
Output
Plugboard
I Q 4 6 8 6 M
T Z 5 7 8 6 Y
T Z 6 8 8 6 F
A E 7 9 8 6 N
K F 8 10 8 6 Y
E C 9 11 8 6 O
S N 10 12 8 6 T
C J 11 13 8 6 Z
O B 12 14 8 6 B
U G 13 15 8 6 Z
R K 14 16 8 6 S
A E 15 17 8 6 A
G I 16 18 8 6 V
E C 17 19 8 6 C
T Z 18 20 8 6 M
O B 19 21 8 6 I
A E 20 22 8 6 A
D T 21 23 8 6 D
M P 22 24 8 6 U
I Q 23 25 8 6 B
T Z 24 1 8 6 X
F D 25 1 8 6 O
E C 1 1 9 6 Y
A E 2 2 9 6 N
R K 3 3 9 6 X
Table 2.2: Example of Purple encipherment
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2.3.4 Weakness of the Purple Cipher
The weakness of the Purple machine is the partition of the plugboard into sixes and
twenties. This partition limits the number of keys or configurations possible. The sixes
switch can have 25 keys or different permutations. As there are three twenties switches
each with 25 different permutations, there can be a total of 253 possible keys. In addition,
there are 6 possible switch motions assigned to the twenties switches. Therefore, Purple
only has 6 x 25 (sixes) x 253 (twenties) = 2,343,750 possible configurations of switches [3].
Regardless of the 6 different switch motions assigned to twenties, the Purple machine will
repeat after encrypting 254 = 390,625 characters. Due to the partitioning of plugboard,
the whole 26 letters of English alphabet (which provide a total of 26! permutations)
cannot be used. Instead, the alphabet is divided into 2 portions, the sixes and twenties,
which produce a much smaller number of 6! x 20! keys [3]. This can be used as an
advantage by the cryptanalysts by determining the sixes portion of the alphabet first.
After the sixes is determined successfully, cryptanalysts can focus on the twenties portion.
The time required to decipher the cipher text is reduced because of the separation of
plugboard into sixes and twenties. The cryptanalysts need not consider all the possible
keys simultaneously when attacking the Purple machine. That means there are only 20!
possible keys and 6 x 253 = 93,750 possible configurations of the twenties, which is an
improvement compared to 26! keys and 6 x 254 = 2,343,750 configurations [3].
2.3.5 Algorithm
2.3.5.1 Encryption
In Figure 2.5 and 2.6, the algorithm for Purple encryption is given. The input to the
Purple machine are plaintext, switches, and plugboard. The input switches should be of
the format (1-1,1,1-12) where the first 1 represents starting position of sixes switch and
1,1,1 represent starting position of twentiesOne, twentiesTwo and twentiesThree switches
respectively. The last two digits represent the fast and middle switches. In line 1, the
sixes switch is built and on line 2, the start position for the sixes switch is set that is
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specified as part of input. In line 3, the twentiesOne switch (encrypt and decrypt) with
the starting position and the matrix setting provided is built. In line 4, start position for
the twentiesOne switch is set. Similarly, in lines 5, 6, 7, and 8 the other two twenties
switches are built and start positions are specified. In lines 9 and 10, the switch motion
rules (fast, middle, slow) are assigned to the twenties switches. In line 13, ‘‘purpleEncrypt”
method is called to perform the encryption of the plaintext.
Figure 2.5: Encryption algorithm for Purple
The ‘‘purpleEncrypt” method algorithm is as shown in Figure 2.6. In line 3, the input
plaintext character is mapped to the external plugboard character. In line 4, the character
is checked to see if it falls under the sixes or twenties alphabet. If its a sixes character, the
plaintext is encrypted using the sixes encryption permutation else it is encrypted using the
twenties one, two, and three switches respectively. The encrypted character is appended
to the cipher text.
2.3.5.2 Decryption
Figure 2.7 shows the method used to decrypt the cipher text. Decryption will be
exactly the same as encryption except for a slight change. In line 8, if the plaintext is
a twenties character then it is decrypted in the reverse order of switches, that is, it is
decrypted using twenties three, two and one switches respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Algorithm for ‘‘purpleEncrypt” method
Figure 2.7: Algorithm for ‘‘purpleDecrypt” method
2.4 PseudoPurple Cipher
2.4.1 Components of the PseudoPurple Machine
The PseudoPurple machine is a variation of the actual Purple machine explained in
the previous section. It is a simple machine from the configuration and a complexity point
of view, but a more powerful machine in terms of the effort required to break the cipher.
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As with the Purple machine, the PseudoPurple machine consists of almost the same
elements i.e input plugboard, switches to permute the text, and the output plugboard.
Unlike the plugboards in Purple, which are divided into sixes and twenties parts, the
plugboards in the PseudoPurple machine are not partitioned.
There is no concept of partitioning the alphabet into sixes and twenties, which makes
PseudoPurple more powerful and less complex than Purple. As there is no partition of
alphabets into sixes and twenties, any permutation of the English alphabet can be used.
This permutation is agreed by both the parties in advance. Also, as there are no twenties
switches, there is no necessity of movement rules for different switch positions such as slow,
fast, and middle as illustrated in the Figure 2.8. The PseudoPurple machine essentially
steps for each plaintext letter.
The encryption process is very simple. If the plaintext character is C1, which is entered
from the typewriter, it is changed to another character C2 based on the chosen plugboard
permutation, and then to C3 based on the encrypt switch configuration. The machine
steps for each character from the initial switch position without any switch motion rules.
Figure 2.8: PseudoPurple Machine
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2.4.2 An example illustrating PseudoPurple’s Encipherment
Consider the plain text ‘‘IT TAKES COURAGE TO ADMIT FEAR’’ with the follow-
ing configuration:
The initial switch position is 4 and the external alphabet is:
NAGVPQOEFKUHCRYWSMIZJDXBLT
Table 2.3 shows the encryption of plaintext using the mentioned switch positions for sixes
and twenties.
The cipher text is: ‘‘HJJRCQVWSUXPZTXGAONQTFWXM”
Plaintext
letter
Input
Plugboard
Encrypt
Switch
Output
Plugboard
I Q 5 H
T Z 6 J
T Z 7 J
A E 8 R
K F 9 C
E C 10 Q
S N 11 V
C J 12 W
O B 13 S
U G 14 U
R K 15 X
A E 16 P
G I 17 Z
E C 18 T
T Z 19 X
O B 20 G
A E 21 A
D T 22 O
M P 23 N
I Q 24 Q
T Z 25 T
F D 1 F
E C 2 W
A E 3 X
R K 4 M
Table 2.3: Example of PseudoPurple encipherment
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2.4.3 Strength of PseudoPurple Machine
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the Purple machine has a weakness due to the splitting
of the internal input and output plugboards into sixes and twenties. Since the alphabet is
divided into 2 portions, the total number of possible keys is: 6! x 20!. However, in the
case of PseudoPurple the total number of possible keys is 26!, since the alphabets is not
divided into two portions.
This means that cryptanalysts require more time and effort to decipher the cipher text
in PseudoPurple when compared to Purple. In the case of Purple, the cryptanalysts can
determine the sixes portion first, which will require them concentrating on 6! keys. After
the sixes setting is determined, the cryptanalysts can concentrate on the twenties switches,
which means 20! possibilities. But in PseudoPurple, the cryptanalysts should consider all
the possible number of keys without splitting the alphabets into sixes and twenties i.e 26!.
2.4.4 Algorithm of PseudoPurple
2.4.4.1 Encryption Algorithm
In Figure 2.9 and 2.10, the algorithm for PseudoPurple encryption is given. The input
to the PseudoPurple machine are plaintext, switch start position, and plugboard. In
lines 1 and 2, the encrypt switch is built and start position is assigned. In line 7, the
‘‘purpleEncrypt” method is called to encrypt the plaintext.
Figure 2.9: PseudoPurple encryption algorithm
The ‘‘purpleEncrypt” method algorithm is as shown in Figure 2.10. In line 3, the input
plaintext character is mapped to the external plugboard character. In lines 4 and 5, the
plaintext is encrypted using the encrypt switch permutation and appended to the cipher
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text.
Figure 2.10: PseudoPurple encryption algorithm
2.4.4.2 Decryption Algorithm
Figure 2.11 shows the method used to decrypt the cipher text. Decryption will be
exactly the same as encryption except for a slight change. In line 5, the cipher text is
decrypted using the decrypt switch permutation and appended to the plaintext.
Figure 2.11: PseudoPurple decryption algorithm
2.5 Genetic Algorithms
2.5.1 History of Evolutionary Computation
In around 1950s, many computer researchers tried to understand evolutionary systems
and believed that the evolution techniques can be used to solve many engineering problems.
The main goal in these evolving systems was to generate a set of optimal or candidate
solutions to a problem by making use of the genetic operators motivated by variation and
selection [13].
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In 1960s, Rechenberg introduced ‘‘evolution strategies”, a technique used to optimize
the solution to given problems using adaption and evolution strategies. Fogel, Owens,
and Walsh [13] then introduced a new technique called ‘‘evolutionary programming”.
In this, candidate solutions were represented as finite state machine by modifying their
state-transition diagrams after which the most optimal solutions were selected. Genetic
algorithms were developed by John Holland [13] and his students in 1960. Holland’s goal
was to study the phenomenon of evolution as it occurs in the nature without thinking
from the engineering perspective and then develop ways to import the same in computer
systems.
The foundation of evolutionary computation is based on the three methods mentioned
previously [13]. These evolutionary techniques can be applied to engineering problems,
where we need to find an optimal solution among the huge number of possible solutions.
2.5.2 Introduction to Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GA) are meta heuristics that use the principles of biology to search
through the candidates and find a solution to the optimization and search problems [8].
Genetic algorithms are motivated by techniques of natural evolution such as inheriting
traits from parents, recombination, and mutation to have individual unique traits. GAs
encode the decision variables or the solutions to the problems as a string of binary values.
These strings, which are the solutions to the problems, are referred to as chromosomes [5].
To evolve to good solutions, there should be a mechanism to separate the probable good
solutions from the bad ones that is called fitness function. Another important terminology
of GAs is the population size, i.e. the number of chromosomes (possible solutions). The
population size, which is specified as part of input, is one of the deciding factors of
scalability and performance of genetic algorithms [4]. A larger population of candidate
solutions may give better solutions than a smaller population of candidate solutions.
Once we determine the two main factors, the representation of the search variable or
chromosome and the measure of separating the good solutions from the bad ones, we can
follow the steps mentioned below to evolve the search variables until we find a better and
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optimal solution.
1. Initialization. The set of variable solutions are randomly selected to create a
population of chromosomes or a set of possible solutions to the given problem.
2. Evaluation. After the initialization of a set of random possible solutions, the
mathematical formula to evaluate the fitness of each of the solutions is applied. This
helps us to determine the good solutions to the problem and identify the bad ones.
3. Selection. The main goal of this step is to select the optimal solution with higher
probability given to solutions that have a better fitness course. This imposes the
survival of the fittest ‘‘Darwin” mechanism on the solutions. More copies of solutions
with better fitness scores are made than the solutions with low fitness scores. Many
selection techniques such as fitness proportionate selection, ranking selection, and
tournament selection are present to make sure that good solutions are separated
from the bad ones [4].
4. Recombination In this step, an offspring is created from two or parental chro-
mosomes or solutions. The offspring created does not match either of the parents
completely, but has some characteristics of each of the parents. There are many
ways of performing recombination such as one-point crossover, two-point crossover
etc.
5. Mutation After the new child solution is created in the recombination step, the
new solution is modified randomly by switching the bits to create a new mutated
child. The purpose of this step is to provide the child solution with its individual
traits.
6. New Population After the new solution is created using evaluation, selection,
recombination, and mutation steps, it is placed in the new population.
7. Termination Repeat steps 2-6 until a termination point is reached, determined by
the number of restarts provided or the best solution found.
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In the next section, we will explain different techniques involved in selection, recombination,
and mutation steps.
2.5.3 Operators in Genetic Algorithms
2.5.3.1 Selection Methods
Selection techniques can be broadly classified into two types.
1. Fitness Proportionate Selection This includes methods such as roulette-wheel
selection (this selection method is employed for cryptanalysis of Purple) and stochastic
universal selection [14]. In roulette-wheel selection, the fitness score of each solution
is computed. Solution with better fitness score is assigned more slots when compared
to solution with a low fitness score. That is, the number of slots allocated to each of
the solutions are directly proportional to the scores. Then solutions are randomly
selected by spinning the wheel.
The following steps are employed in the roulette-wheel selection method:
(a) Evaluate the fitness, fi, of each individual in the population.
(b) Calculate the total number of slots to be allocated. Say the population size is
n, then s=10 x n, where s is the number of slots.
(c) Compute the probability (slot size), pi = fi /
∑n
j=1 fj , where n is the population
size.
(d) Allocate each solution, pi x s number of slots.
(e) Generate a random number r ∈ (0,s ].
(f) Select the solution which is in rth slot.
2. Ordinal Selection This involves techniques such as tournament and truncation
selections. In tournament selection, s chromosomes are chosen randomly and a
tournament is started between these chromosomes. The fittest or most optimal
individual in the group of k chromosomes wins the tournament and is elected as
the parent. Usually 2 chromosomes are chosen randomly to start the tournament.
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This scheme requires at least n tournaments to select n parent chromosomes. In
the truncation method, each mating pool requires that s copies of chromosomes be
assigned to each of the top (1/s)th of the chromosomes. [4].
2.5.3.2 Recombination (Crossover) Methods
After the selection methods, two parent chromosomes are chosen [14]. Different
recombination techniques listed below can be applied to generate new offspring.
1. One point crossover A uniform random number r is selected across the string
length, which is called the crossover point. The bits from one side of the site are
recombined as shown in Figure 2.12 to generate new offspring.
2. Two point crossover In two point crossover, two random crossover points are
selected. The bits from two sides of the site are recombined as shown in Figure 2.12
to generate new offspring. There can be k -point crossover, where k random crossover
points are selected.
3. Uniform crossover In uniform crossover as illustrated in Figure 2.12, all the bits
are exchanged between the pair of chromosomes, which are selected at random with
a certain swapping probability (usually this probability value is 0.5) [4].
2.5.3.3 Mutation methods
Mutation ensures that there is diversity in the offsprings and have their own individual
traits. It prevents stagnation in the evolution [4]. There are two broad categories of
mutation as mentioned below.
1. Flip mutation In this, a uniform random bit across the string length is selected and
then flipped. That is, a ‘1’ is changed to ‘0’ and vice versa as shown in Figure 2.13
2. Swap mutation In this, two uniform random bits across the chromosome length
are selected and then swapped as shown in Figure 2.14
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Figure 2.12: Different recombination techniques [4]
Figure 2.13: Flip mutation [5]
Figure 2.14: Swap mutation [5]
2.6 Hidden Markov Models
A stochastic process consists of a number of events where the outcome of each event
depends on a certain probability [15].
A Markov process is a stochastic process that consists of the following three properties [15]
• The number of possible states is finite and fixed.
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• The outcome of an event at each stage depends on the outcome of an event from
the previous stage.
• The probabilities remain constant over time.
A hidden Markov model (HMM) is a Markov process in which the system being modeled
is assumed to have hidden states [16]. In Markov models, the states are directly visible to
the user and therefore the state transition probabilities are the only parameters. But, in
HMMs the states are not directly visible, however the output, which is dependent on the
states is visible. Each state has a possible distribution over the possible output tokens.
Therefore the output token gives some information of the hidden states.
2.6.1 Notation
The various components and notations associated with hidden Markov models (HMM)
are [6]
T = length of observation sequence
N = number of states in the model
M = number of observation symbols
Q = {q0,q1,....,qN−1} = distinct states of the Markov process
V = {0,1,..., M -1} = set of possible observations
A = state transition probabilities
B = observation probability matrix
pi = initial state distribution
O =(O0, O1, ...., OT−1) observation sequence
A generic hidden Markov model is as shown in Figure 2.15, where Xi is the hidden
states and the rest of the notations are listed above. The Markov process is determined
by the current state and the A matrix. We are only able to observe O, which is related to
the hidden states of the Markov process by the matrix B .
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Figure 2.15: Hidden Markov model [6]
2.6.2 Three problems of HMM
HMM has three types of problems associated with it. We will discuss the three problems
briefly.
2.6.2.1 Problem 1
This evaluates the model. Given the model λ= (A, B, pi) and a sequence of observations
O, find P (O | λ). Here, we want to determine the probability of the output sequence,
given the model.
2.6.2.2 Problem 2
This deals with decoding of the model. Given the model λ= (A, B, pi) and a sequence
of observations O, we need to find the state sequence that produced the observation
sequence.
2.6.2.3 Problem 3
Given the parameters N and M, the observation sequence O, we need to find the
model λ= (A, B, pi), which has the highest probability of generating the given observation
sequence.
2.6.3 Baum-Welch Algorithm
The Baum Welch algorithm is used to find the hidden parameters of the hidden
Markov model. It makes use of the forward-backward algorithm. We will discuss the
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forward-backward algorithms in detail in the next sections.
2.6.3.1 Forward Algorithm
The forward algorithm in context of HMM is used to calculate the probability of state
at given time, given the history of evidence.
The Forward Algorithm analyzes the probabilities of transitioning from one state to
the next based on the given observations [17]. The solution to the Forward Algorithm is
to iteratively compute the state transition probabilities for each observation [6].
To find the solution to problem 1, we find P (O | λ) with the help of forward algorithm
or α - pass. For t = 0, 1,..., T - 1 and i = 0, 1,..., N -1, define
αt(i) = P (O0, O1, ...., Ot, xt = qi | λ)
αt(i) is the probability of the partial observation sequence upto time t, where the Markov
process is in current state qi at time t.
αt(i) can be computed recursively as follows [6]
1. Let α0(i) = piibi( O0 ), for i = 0, 1,...,N - 1.
2. For t = 1,2,...,T - 1 and i = 0,1,...,N - 1, compute
αt(i) =
[ ∑N−1
j=0 αt−1(j)aji
]
bi(Ot)
3. Then finally,
P (O | λ) = ∑N−1i=0 αT−1(i)
2.6.3.2 Backward Algorithm
To find the solution to problem 2, we use the Backward algorithm, or β - pass. This is
almost same as forward algorithm, but we start calculating the probability from the end
and work our way up to the start. That is, the β - pass starts from the last observation
symbol and ends with the first observation symbol.
For t = 0, 1,..., T - 1 and i = 0, 1,..., N - 1, we define [6]
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βt(i) = P (Ot+1, Ot+2,..., OT−1, xt = qi | λ)
βt(i) can be computed recursively as follows [6]
1. Let βT−1(i) = 1, for i = 0,1,...,N - 1.
2. For t = T - 2,T - 3,...,0 and i = 0,1,...,N - 1 compute
βt(i) =
∑N−1
j=0 aijbj (Ot+1) βt+1(j)
2.6.3.3 Computing Gamma and di-Gammas
For t = 0, 1,..., T - 1 and i = 0, 1,..., N - 1, we define [6]
γt(i) = P ( xt = qi | O, λ)
From the above formula, γt(i) can be defined as most likely state at time t is the state
qi for which γt(i) is maximum.
γt(i) can be calculated from α and β as follows
γt(i)= αt(i) βt(i) / P (O | λ)
Then γt(i, j) shows the probability of transition from state qi at time t to another
state qj at time t + 1.
γt(i, j) can be defined in terms of α, β, A and B as follows
γt(i, j)= αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j) / P (O | λ)
2.6.3.4 Scaling and Re-estimation
The above calculations require multiplying the probabilities. The values tend to 0
as T increases, which may lead to underflow. The solution to this problem is to scale
the values, but care should be taken to verify the validity of the re-estimation formula.
Re-estimation is an iterative process. After all the values are computed, the final step is
to re-estimate values for pi, A, B. The next iteration starts again with new re-estimated
values to calculate α, β, γ and Di-gamma values. The process repeats until the probability
is better than the previous iteration. The subsequent section describes the entire process
of the Baum-Welch Algorithm in detail with the help of pseudo code.
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2.6.4 HMM algorithm
The values N and M are fixed and observation sequence is assumed to be known [6].
1. Initialization
The initial values for matrix A,B, and pi are computed. pi is 1 x N, A ={aij} is N x
N, B ={bj(k)} is N x M. The three matrices are row-stochastic [6].
Let
maxIters = maximum number of re-estimation iterations
iters = 0
oldLogProb = - ∞.
2. The α pass
//compute α0(i)
c0= 0
for i = 0 to N - 1
α0(i) = piibi( O0 )
c0 = c0 + α0(i)
next i
// scale the α0(i) c0 = 1/ c0
for i = 0 to N - 1
α0(i) = c0α0(i)
next i
// compute αt(i)
for t = 0 to T - 1
ct = 0
for i = 0 to N - 1
αt(i) = 0
for j = 0 to N - 1
αt(i) = αt(i) + αt−1(j)aji
next j
αt(i) = αt(i)bi(Ot)
ct = ct + αt(i)
next i
// scale αt(i)
ct = 1 / ct
for i = 0 to N - 1
αt(i) = ctαt(i)
next i
next t
3. The β pass
//Let βT−1(i) = 1 scaled by cT−1
28
for i = 0 to N - 1
βT−1(i) = cT−1
next i
// β pass
for t = T - 2 to 0 by -1
for i = 0 to N - 1
βt(i) = 0
for j = 0 to N - 1
βt(i) = βt(i) + aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
next j
// scale βt(i) with same scale factor as αt(i)
βt(i) = ctβt(i)
next i
next t
4. Compute γt(i, j) and γt(i)
for t = 0 to T - 2
denom = 0
for i = 0 to N - 1
for j = 0 to N - 1
denom = denom + αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
next j
next i
for i = 0 to N - 1
γt(i) = 0
for j = 0 to N - 1
γt(i, j) =( αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)) /denom
γt(i)= γt(i) + γt(i, j)
next j
next i
next t
5. Re-estimate B and pi
// re-estimate pi
for i = 0 to N - 1
pii = γ0(i) next i
// re-estimate B
for i = 0 to N - 1
for j = 0 to M - 1
numer = 0
denom = 0
for t = 0 to T - 2
if ( Ot == j ) then
numer = numer + γt(i)
29
end if
denom = denom + γt(i)
next t
bi(j) = numer / denom
next j
next i
6. Compute log[P (O | λ)]
logProb = 0
for i = 0 to T - 1
logProb = logProb + log(ci)
next i
logProb = - logProb
7. Should we iterate again ...?
iters = iters + 1
if (iters < maxIters and logProb > oldLogProb) then
oldLogProb = logProb
goto 2
else
output λ= (A,B, pi)
end if
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Chapter 3
Genetic Algorithms Approach
3.1 Purple with Fixed Plugboard
The Purple cipher consists of two parts that form a key. One is the permutation of
the alphabets to form the plugboard, which remains constant throughout the execution of
Purple algorithm. That is, it does not step for each character in the plaintext. Second is
the switch settings that are variable and step for each of the characters in the plaintext
with some governing rules. The plugboard is connected to the internal plugboard. The
sixes portion of the plugboard (external plugboard) is mapped to the sixes portion of the
internal plugboard and the twenties portion of the plugboard is mapped to the twenties
portion of the internal plugboard. However, in reality the Japanese government kept the
two plugboard settings identical [8]. Therefore, in this section we use genetic algorithms
to decipher the text keeping the plugboard fixed, whereas the switch setting is unknown.
3.1.1 Overview of the Algorithm
The main steps used to decipher the text using genetic algorithms are listed below.
• The switch settings are generated randomly in the format x-x,x,x-xx. The number of
such variable solutions generated depends on the population size parameter specified
as an input to this algorithm.
• After the initial set of variable solutions are generated randomly, the fitness of
each solution is computed. This is done by decrypting the cipher text with each of
the switch settings generated to obtain the putative plaintext. Then the putative
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plaintext and the actual plaintext are compared using the hamming distance. This
is a known plaintext attack, which is where the attacker has access to both the
plaintext and the cipher text. Thus, we obtain a fitness score that helps us to
differentiate between the potential good solutions and identify the bad ones. In
reality, we could use the English alphabet letter frequency count technique as a
means to determine the ideal score of the cipher text.
• Then we use the roulette-wheel selection technique explained in Section 2.5.3.1 to
select two parents (possible solutions) giving higher probability to solutions that
have better fitness score.
• After selecting two switch settings from the population, we create a child switch
setting. To avoid the child resembling either one of the parents completely, one-point
crossover, explained in Section 2.5.3.2, is performed so that the child has traits of
both the parent switch settings.
• The new child switch solution is mutated by flipping any one of the random bits of
the switch solution. This is done so that the child switch has some traits of its own.
• The new child switch is placed in a new population, where the size of the new
population is the same as the size of the old population.
• The above steps are repeated for the number of restarts specified by the input
parameters.
• The switch with the best fitness score is selected as the key.
Figure 3.1 explains the above algorithm in terms of a flowchart.
In this experiment, we encrypt some sample text using the Purple encryption method
with the switch setting ‘‘12-6,3,10-31” and a fixed plugboard. The plaintext is as follows.
ALICEWASBEGINNINGTOGETVERYTIREDOFSITTINGBYHERSISTERONTHEBANKANDOF
HAVINGNOTHINGTODOONCEORTWICESHEHADPEEPEDINTOTHEBOOKHERSISTERWASRE
ADINGBUTITHADNOPICTURESORCONVERSATIONSINITANDWHATISTHEUSEOFABOOKT
HOUGHTALICEWITHOUTPICTURESORCONVERSATIONSOSHEWASCONSIDERINGINHERO
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart for genetic algorithm
WNMINDASWELLASSHECOULDFORTHEHOTDAYMADEHERFEELVERYSLEEPYANDSTUPIDW
HETHERTHEPLEASUREOFMAKINGADAISYCHAINWOULDBEWORTHTHETROUBLEOFGETTI
NGUPANDPICKINGTHEDAISIESWHENSUDDENLYAWHITERABBITWITHPINKEYESRANCL
OSEBYHERTHEREWASNOTHINGSOVERYREMARKABLEINTHATNORDIDALICETHINKITSO
VERYMUCHOUTOFTHEWAYTOHEARTHERABBITSAYTOITSELFOHDEAROHDEARISHALLBE
LATEWHENSHETHOUGHTITOVERAFTERWARDSITOCCURREDTOHERTHATSHEOUGHTTOHA
VEWONDEREDATTHISBUTATTHETIMEITALLSEEMEDQUITENATURALBUTWHENTHERABB
ITACTUALLYTOOKAWATCHOUTOFITSWAISTCOATPOCKETANDLOOKEDATITANDTHENHU
RRIEDONALICESTARTEDTOHERFEETFORITFLASHEDACROSSHERMINDTHATSHEHADNE
VERBEFORESEENARABBITWITHEITHERAWAISTCOATPOCKETORAWATCHTOTAKEOUTOF
ITANDBURNINGWITHCURIOSITYSHERANACROSSTHEFIELDAFTERITANDFORTUNATEL
YWASJUSTINTIMETOSEEITPOP
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We get the following cipher text from the plaintext after encrypting using the previously
mentioned key.
YQURYFOVTOBUXRILBKOQOLZOLITUNYTIWSYHFYQJBOFYCTADXANUHJHEDAKRAXTIZSAPAT
RVETGOGLSEGIYZZUEZWMEQIRMOZYCLUICIGOGDOLRYRIUNZIWQYCXOPREJJYYKIGFDIKOK
CATPYKAHPOKIMYTQIRPOKZINIYCFAJYSYXHCHOWICNZUERYASERIARNGOAFSBESOBELIKW
OIMDIBBYWANOGNIPQENJYTIOXFESXAZABRYQKUWAXACBIXCEDUFSXONSARCANVYCGXIDYA
XVNOHRLOZUTJOEGUTIBAJNEIJJAWIPJYOMYUZFPHEDUKZFIMZYBZKUXZYIDOMUAVGUNUNR
YHOOHADZEYBDAAPWFIKYJMMFQUBPYATKEOXWYXWIWRYTEGHVIJWAHGKZAMEYQUOTTFUGLO
WTIXNIEPHIBASEVTULLILHHAXJYOOTHEQLRUJEWAVYXNQOSIBEKMEQKONNGEGABIQUDIMB
UTBYUDVGUKRUZFIMODABUHWOJQYRSYTYHYGAMKYANIPHVUWIUNYHIIDGTIJESBURKYYTOY
KVOFZYGMYEWOMCAYSUWHYZMWOFOJEPJURWCOQQAOMDKOPUDEXIHXOKLUZDZUFOLTOZSEPT
UXEXTHOWCDOIYZQMQEPENISYXQAZUJAFPHIKRYZEMHPOROSEOBYHRROUWOKNIYSYPUHARE
WGIGMXADLPURITCETOKDEIMHUSUAZUVONWROIQIFETDCEYBJGIYRZYMFAMENTXAISOSOBU
NINTSNIDFASGIUVOWIDICUFGESVICMETENVEAKRUTUQQVUCFYWUNQARHSEZJOTTPBAQGCA
PADHAKYHSASUXIJEADEDAVFOMGYJNAYVPONYPOORXJYESKEFJAPIRIXUJBTVECOSYUUQOM
ELIVJTEKRUPSXIPPBIZIUPIFAFQOSERAKDYFNDNATAEXWYZGULENISWSINHOWIKOTISOHP
IRXAMCUREQYXIYUTLEV
We use this cipher text for decrypting using the randomly generated switch settings
in the population of the predefined size. We compute the fitness score of these possible
switch settings, which helps in identifying the good solutions. Then we select the two
solutions using roulette-wheel selection, where the probability of selecting a solution is
directly proportional to its fitness score. After this, one-point crossover is used to generate
a new child switch. Then, the switch is mutated and placed in the new population. These
steps are repeated for the number of restarts by the input. The solution with the best
fitness score is selected. Using this approach, we were successful in obtaining the plaintext
with 100% accuracy.
Data size: 1000 characters
Population Size: 700
Restarts: 1200
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Key: 12-6,3,10-31
3.1.2 Results
Multiple experiments were computed for different cipher text sizes. In each of the
experiments, we varied the population size and number of restarts and calculated the
accuracy of the obtained solution. Each subsection will include the actual results in tabular
format and graphs that demonstrate the effect of population size and number of restarts
on the results obtained.
3.1.2.1 Data size of 250 characters
3.1.2.1.1 Results with varying number of restarts
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 250
characters of plaintext data by varying only the number of restarts while keeping the
constant population size of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext
is 3-7,5,12-12.
In Figure 3.2 we plot a graph of the score vs the number of restarts to see the effect of
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 84.20 3-10,6,19-21
100 84.06 3-6,17,2-23
1000 84.61 3-25,19,16-23
1200 85.59 3-7,10,7-13
10000 89.86 5-7,5,12-12
Table 3.1: Experiment performed with 250 characters of plaintext by varying the number
of restarts
number of restarts on the accuracy of the results. We see that as the number of restarts
increase, the scores of the decrypted plaintext also increase.
3.1.2.1.2 Results with varying population size
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 250
characters of plaintext data by varying only the population size while keeping the constant
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Figure 3.2: Restarts vs Accuracy/Score with constant population size (250 characters)
number of restarts of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is
3-7,5,12-12.
In Figure 3.3 we plot a graph of the score vs the population size to see the effect of the
Population
Size
Score
Switch
Settings
10 84.06 3-7,14,9-31
100 83.96 3-25,11,8-23
500 84.85 3-14,24,3-13
700 84.85 3-1,15,24-13
1000 84.85 3-22,24,16-21
Table 3.2: Experiment performed with 250 characters of plaintext by varying the population
size
population size on the accuracy of the results. We can observe that the scores remain
almost constant with an increase in the population size.
3.1.2.1.3 Results with varying number of restarts and population size
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 250
characters of plaintext data by varying both, the number of restarts and the population
size. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is 3-7,5,12-12.
Figure 3.4 shows a unified view of population size, restarts and corresponding scores. The
y-axis 1 (left) represents population size while y-axis 2 (right) represents score and the
number of restarts are specified on the x-axis. The blue line graph marks the intersection
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Figure 3.3: Population size vs Accuracy/Score with constant number of restarts (250
characters)
Population
Size
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 10 82.57 3-7,25,19-12
100 100 84.24 3-18,6,20-31
500 1000 85.64 3-11,23,12-31
700 1200 88.75 6-7,5,12-12
1000 10000 100.0 3-7,5,12-12
Table 3.3: Experiment performed with 250 characters of plaintext
of population size and restarts, whereas the bars show the increase in scores. From this
graph, we can gather that as the number of restarts and population size increase, accuracy
increases as well. We could successfully decipher the cipher text with 100% accuracy with
a population size of 1000 and 10000 restarts.
3.1.2.2 Data size of 500 characters
3.1.2.2.1 Results with varying number of restarts
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 500
characters of plaintext data by varying only the number of restarts while keeping the
constant population size of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext
is 8-3,15,20-23.
In Figure 3.5 we plot a graph of the score vs the number of restarts to see the effect of
number of restarts on the accuracy of the results. We see that as the number of restarts
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Figure 3.4: Restarts vs Population size vs Accuracy/Score (250 characters)
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 82.95 8-18,19,21-32
100 83.47 8-5,18,4-21
1000 84.12 8-8,10,20-21
1200 83.95 8-18,7,21-31
10000 84.12 8-8,10,20-21
Table 3.4: Experiment performed with 500 characters of plaintext by varying the number
of restarts
increase, the scores of the decrypted plaintext fluctuate up and down.
Figure 3.5: Restarts vs Accuracy/Score with constant population size (500 characters)
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3.1.2.2.2 Results with varying population size
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 500
characters of plaintext data by varying only the population size while keeping the constant
number of restarts of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is
8-3,15,20-23.
In Figure 3.6 we plot a graph of the score vs the population size to see the effect of the
Population
Size
Score
Switch
Settings
10 82.65 8-2,23,14-12
100 83.72 8-6,21,3-32
500 83.95 8-18,7,21-31
700 86.77 1-3,15,20-23
1000 83.55 8-6,13,24-12
Table 3.5: Experiment performed with 500 characters of plaintext by varying the population
size
population size on the accuracy of the results. We notice that with an increase in the
population size the scores remain almost constant except for a slightly high score when
the population size is 700.
Figure 3.6: Population size vs Accuracy/Score with constant number of restarts (500
characters)
3.1.2.2.3 Results with varying number of restarts and population size
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This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 500
characters of plaintext data by varying both, the number of restarts and the population
size. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is 8-3,15,20-23.
Figure 3.7 plots population size, restarts and corresponding scores into a single view.
Population
Size
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 10 82.575 8-2,8,19-21
100 100 83.35 8-8,5,1-21
500 1000 84.05 8-15,8,7-13
700 1200 84.3 8-19,19,7-23
1000 10000 89.75 5-3,15,20-23
Table 3.6: Experiment performed with 500 characters of plaintext
While the left y-axis represents the population size, the right y-axis shows the score and
the x-axis shows changes to the random restarts. The blue line graph plots changes to the
population size and restarts. The bars show the increase in scores with varying population
size and restarts. From this graph, we can concur that as the number of restarts and the
population size increase, the accuracy increases as well.
Figure 3.7: Restarts vs Population size vs Accuracy/Score (500 characters)
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3.1.2.3 Data size of 1000 characters
3.1.2.3.1 Results with varying number of restarts
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 1000
characters of plaintext data by varying only the number of restarts while keeping the
constant population size of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext
is 12-6,3,10-31.
In Figure 3.8 we plot a graph of the score vs the number of restarts to see the effect of
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 83.19 12-4,9,24-13
100 83.19 12-7,4,15-31
1000 84.02 12-11,22,11-32
1200 83.55 12-21,16,9-12
10000 89.01 10-6,3,10-31
Table 3.7: Experiment performed with 1000 characters of plaintext by varying the number
of restarts
number of restarts on the accuracy of the results. We see that the scores of the decrypted
plaintext remain almost constant for the initial restart inputs but there is a rise in the
scores for 10000 restarts.
Figure 3.8: Restarts vs Accuracy/Score with constant population size (1000 characters)
3.1.2.3.2 Results with varying population size
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This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 1000
characters of plaintext data by varying only the population size while keeping the constant
number of restarts of 100. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is
12-6,3,10-31.
In Figure 3.9 we plot a graph of the score vs the population size to see the effect of the
Population
Size
Score
Switch
Settings
10 82.59 12-18,24,25-12
100 83.09 12-16,7,3-21
500 84.79 3-6,3,10-31
700 86.79 19-6,3,10-31
1000 87.63 7-6,3,10-31
Table 3.8: Experiment performed with 1000 characters of plaintext by varying the
population size
population size on the accuracy of the results. We notice that with an increase in the
population size the scores also increase.
Figure 3.9: Population size vs Accuracy/Score with constant number of restarts (1000
characters)
3.1.2.3.3 Results with varying number of restarts and population size
This section lists the experiments and the associated results, performed with 1000
characters of plaintext data by varying both, the number of restarts and the population
size. The actual switch settings used to encrypt the plaintext is 12-6,3,10-31.
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Figure 3.10 plots population size, restarts and corresponding scores across three axes.
Population
Size
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
10 10 82.645 12-13,1,20-31
100 100 83.43 12-12,11,15-32
500 1000 87.63 7-6,3,10-31
700 1200 100.0 12-6,3,10-31
Table 3.9: Experiment performed with 1000 characters of plaintext
The y-axis 1 (left) represents the population size while y-axis 2 (right) represents score
and number of restarts are specified on x-axis. While the line graph shows changes to
the population size and restarts, the bars depict the increase in scores. We can conclude
from the graph that the increase in number of restarts with incremental population size
provides better chance to obtain more accurate or higher scores. We could successfully
decipher the cipher text with 100% accuracy only with population size of 700 and 1200
restarts.
Figure 3.10: Restarts vs Population size vs Accuracy/Score (1000 characters)
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3.2 Purple without Fixed Plugboard
As discussed in Section 3.1, the Purple key consists of the plugboard permutation that
remains constant through the encryption process and the switch settings that step for each
of the plaintext characters. In this section, we will discuss the decipherment of cipher text,
without keeping the plugboard fixed. That is, both the plugboard and switch settings are
unknown. We use genetic algorithms to find the possible solution for Purple that consists
of the plugboard and switch settings.
3.2.1 Overview of the algorithm
The main steps used to decipher the text using genetic algorithms are listed below.
• Since the plugboard is not fixed unlike in Section 3.1, different permutations of the
English alphabet are generated randomly. The switch settings are also generated
randomly in the format x-x,x,x-xx. The number of such solutions generated depend
of the population size parameter specified as an input to this algorithm.
• After the initial set of possible solutions are generated randomly, the fitness of each
solution is computed. To find the fitness score of each of the keys, we decipher the
cipher text with each of key combination (plugboard and switch settings) generated
randomly to obtain the putative plaintext. Then the putative plaintext and the
actual plaintext are compared using the hamming distance. This is a known plaintext
attack, which is where the attacker has access to both the plaintext and the cipher
text. Thus, we obtain a fitness score that helps us to differentiate between the
potential good solutions and identify the bad ones. In reality, we could use the
English alphabet letter frequency count technique as a means to determine the ideal
score of the cipher text.
• Then we use the roulette-wheel selection technique explained in Section 2.5.3.1 to
select two parents (possible solutions) giving higher probability to solutions that
have better fitness scores.
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• After selecting two solutions from the population, we create a child key. To avoid
the child switch settings resembling either one of the parent switches completely,
one-point crossover is performed so that the child has traits of both the parent switch
settings. In the case of the plugboard settings, a slightly different technique is used
to perform crossover. As in reality, among the two parent plugboards, one with a
better score dominates. Therefore, the child switch inherits most of its traits from
the strongest parent plugboard. However, it also inherits few traits from its weak
parent plugboard. That is, the child plugboard has the majority of its characters
the same as the dominant parent plugboard, but inherits some random characters
from its weaker plugboard.
• The mutation of the new child solution is done in two different ways for plugboard
and switch settings. For the plugboard part of the solution, swap mutation is used.
That is, basically two random characters are swapped. On the other hand, switch
settings are mutated in the same manner as discussed in the previous section. That
is, any of the random bits are flipped from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or vice versa. This is done so
that the child switch has some traits of its own.
• The new child key is placed in a new population. The new population is populated
using such child key and the size of the new population is the same as the size of
the old population.
• The above steps are repeated for the number of restarts specified as part of input
parameters.
• The optimal switch with the best fitness score is selected as the key.
3.2.2 Results
Multiple experiments were computed for different data sizes. In each of the experiments,
we varied the population size and the number of restarts and calculated the accuracy of
the obtained solution. Each subsection will include the actual results in tabular format
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and graphs that demonstrate the effect of population size and number of restarts on the
obtained results.
3.2.2.1 Data size of 250 characters
This section lists the experiments and the associated result, performed with 250
characters of plaintext data. The actual switch setting and plugboard used to encrypt the
plaintext are 5-8,3,15-12 and ‘‘CKXTYUPELVNGWFZAOHQRJBSIDM” respectively.
Figure 3.11 plots the population size, restarts and corresponding scores into a single view.
Population
Size
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
Plugboard
10 10 68.26 1-9,4,17-12 ZAUTHVYRIXBFPGKNWESCJODLQM
100 100 72.25 4-19,18,18-23 BFKMSEIJCTPRUHGWLYXOANQDZV
500 1000 73.28 5-2,6,9-31 SEIGACFQWOHDUJTXLNKRPVZMYB
700 1200 73.46 13-21,19,1-23 PORAGBEXKFVYISJQTNHLMZWCUD
1000 10000 73.79 19-20,12,16-23 NMBZWLFVQHORUTXKGEASYCDJPI
Table 3.10: Experiment performed with 250 characters of plaintext without fixed plugboard
While the left y-axis represents the population size, the right y-axis shows the score and
the x-axis shows changes to the random restarts. The blue line graph plots changes to the
population size and restarts. The bars show the increase in scores with varying population
size and restarts. From this graph, we can concur that as the number of restarts and
population size increase, there is a steady slight rise in the scores as well.
3.2.2.2 Data size of 1000 characters
This section lists the experiments and the associated result performed with 1000
characters of plaintext data. The actual switch setting and plugboard used to encrypt the
plaintext are 12-6,3,10-31 and ‘‘NOKTYUXEQLHBRMPDICJASVWGZF” respectively.
Figure 3.12 plots population size, restarts, and corresponding scores across three axes. The
y-axis 1 (left) represents population size while the y-axis 2 (right) represents score and the
random restarts are specified on the x-axis. While the line graph shows changes to the
population size and restarts, the bars depict the increase in scores. Though the results
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Figure 3.11: Restarts vs Population size vs Accuracy/Score without fixed plugboard (250
characters)
Population
Size
Restarts Score
Switch
Settings
Plugboard
10 10 68.74374 2-2,22,10-21 SOWTXUBAIJNRHGMKDEQVLZPFCY
100 100 71.05856 12-7,13,20-21 EYHWXBZRGMAFNLUIVOCQDPTKJS
500 1000 72.13463 12-12,23,3-32 JOITZVREWKAXMHSDBNQGUCLYPF
700 1200 72.97297 12-13,16,19-32 CKXTYUPELVNGWFZAOHQRJBSIDM
1000 10000 75.21271 12-13,5,12-13 NEBTYUXRMZHAFPJWILDVCQSKGO
Table 3.11: Experiment performed with 1000 characters of plaintext without fixed plug-
board
do not have good accuracy, the scores do increase with higher population sizes and more
restarts.
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Figure 3.12: Restarts vs Population size vs Accuracy/Score without fixed plugboard (1000
characters)
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Chapter 4
Hidden Markov Model Approach
As mentioned in Section 2.4, PseudoPurple is a variation of Purple. It is simpler in
terms of configuration and the complexity of the code, but with a larger key space than
Purple. PseudoPurple has no sixes-twenties split. The plugboard is the permutation of
the English alphabet and is not partitioned into sixes and twenties. As it is not complex
and more straightforward, we tried to decipher PseudoPurple using HMMs. The initial
switch position is assumed to be a known value and the plugboard is unknown and forms
the key. As there is no sixes-twenties split, and therefore no motion rules as there are in
Purple, the HMM implementation is slightly simplified for PseudoPurple. This motivated
us to use HMMs on PseudoPurple rather than Purple itself.
4.1 Overview of the Algorithm
• We first train HMM using English text to obtain the digraph statistics. These
statistics form matrix A. These statistics can be calculated externally and substituted
within matrix A [18]. Matrix A for PseudoPurple is 26x26x26 matrix. Each of Ai is
matrix A with its rows permuted by Pi and its columns permuted by Pi+1, with AN
having its rows permuted by PN and its columns permuted by P1, where each Pi is
a permutation of the 26 letters. We assume that we know the initial point in the
permutation, say m. Since PseudoPurple steps for each of the characters, we need
to step matrix A accordingly. We use matrices Am, Am+1, Am+2,... and for steps 1,
2, 3,...
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• We use randomly generated seed values to initialize the matrices pi and B [19]
• We compute the random plugboard permutations
• We encrypt the plaintext using the generated random plugboard permutation to
obtain the cipher text.
• We train the hidden Markov model using the cipher text obtained in the previous
step. Matrix A containing the digraph frequencies should not be re-estimated.
• The decryption key can be obtained from matrix B, which contains the emission
probability for the observation symbols (cipher text) and the plaintext symbols. We
can choose the most probable internal state (plaintext symbol) for each of the cipher
text symbols [19]. This is explained in detail in Section 4.1.1.
• We decrypt the cipher text using the decryption key obtained from the previous
step.
• This is a known plaintext attack, which is where the attacker has access to both
the plaintext and the cipher text. The putative plaintext and the original plaintext
are compared to find the data score. Also, the key obtained from matrix B and the
actual key are compared to obtain key score. Since the data scores can fluctuate
even for the same key scores, we show the key scores to track or evaluate the final
results.
• The above steps are repeated for the number of random restarts [20] specified as
part of the input parameters.
4.1.1 Computation of the Decryption Key
Once the model has been trained, matrix B, with the final emission probabilities is
obtained. The goal is to retrieve the most probable internal state for each of the observation
symbols (cipher text symbols) [21]. The row headers represent the internal (hidden) states,
whereas the columns represent the observation symbols. To obtain the most probable
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internal state for each of the observation symbols, we start with the observation symbol
located in the column header and pick the internal state with the highest probability.
This is repeated for all the observation symbols. This can be seen with a simple example.
Consider the sample matrix B below, which contains 4 internal states (a to d) and 4
observation symbols (1 to 4) [19]. This contains the final emission probabilities after the
training. As shown in Table 4.1, we choose the row with the highest probability for each
of the observation symbols. In other words, we select the most probable plaintext symbol
for the cipher text symbol. The highest probabilities for each observation symbol are
highlighted in bold.
Figure 4.1 shows the flowchart to decipher plaintext for PseudoPurple using HMM.
1 2 3 4
a 0.0010 0.0000 0.6211 0.0030
b 0.0000 0.5000 0.2201 0.0080
c 0.8334 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000
d 0.0010 0.0000 0.0011 0.7030
Table 4.1: Example of computing the decryption key from matrix B
4.2 Results
Different experiments were performed to decipher the cipher text by varying the data
size of the sample data. In each of these experiments we used different random restarts
to increase the accuracy of the data score and key score. The following sections list the
results obtained in tabular format as well as in the form of the graphs.
4.2.1 Data size of 100 characters
This section shows the results obtained by training the HMM with 100 characters of
sample data and different random restarts. Figure 4.2 shows the bar graph of scores vs
restarts for 100 characters of plaintext. We can observe that the accuracy increases with
the number of restarts till 50000 but as the random restarts goes higher than this, the
accuracy of the score drops.
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart for HMM algorithm
Figure 4.2: Key scores and Data scores vs Restarts (100 characters)
4.2.2 Data size of 250 characters
This section shows the results obtained by training HMMs with 250 characters of
sample data and different random restarts. In Figure 4.3 we see a graph of scores plotted
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Restarts Data Score Key Score
1 0.0 0.0
10 5.0 3.84
100 8.0 7.69
1000 9.0 7.69
10000 6.0 7.69
50000 9.0 19.23
100000 7.0 11.53
Table 4.2: Experiment performed with 100 characters of sample data
Restarts Data Score Key Score
1 2.4 3.84
10 2.4 3.84
100 4.8 7.69
1000 4.0 7.69
10000 8.8 15.38
50000 11.2 19.23
100000 7.6 11.53
Table 4.3: Experiment performed with 250 characters of sample data
against the restarts for plaintext of 250 characters. With this graph we can see that the
accuracy increases steadily with number of restarts till 50000 but as the random restarts
reach 100000 restarts, the accuracy drops.
Figure 4.3: Key scores and Data scores vs Restarts (250 characters)
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4.2.3 Data size of 1000 characters
This section shows the results obtained by training the HMM with 1000 characters of
sample data and different random restarts. Figure 4.4 depicts the results in the form of a
Restarts Data Score Key Score
1 3.1 3.84
10 4.4 3.84
100 4.4 3.84
1000 4.5 3.84
10000 3.4 3.84
50000 9.0 7.69
100000 4.5 7.69
Table 4.4: Experiment performed with 1000 characters of sample data
bar graph for cipher text of 1000 characters. We can see that the HMM does not perform
well with an increase in data size. The scores do not have a steady rise with increasing
restarts.
Figure 4.4: Key scores and Data scores vs Restarts (1000 characters)
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Purple was a complex homophonic cipher, which was used by the Japanese government
during World War II to communicate secret messages to their diplomats in many places
around the world.
We tried to perform cryptanalysis of the Purple machine using genetic algorithms by
varying the data size, population size, and number of restarts. We conducted several
iterations of cryptanalysis using genetic algorithms with fixed plugboard settings, where
we could obtain the plaintext from the cipher text with 100% accuracy. The scores
obtained from these experiments improve with an increase in the number of random
restarts and population size. We also used genetic algorithms to decipher Purple without
fixed plugboard settings. Though the results obtained are not highly accurate, we could
see that the accuracy of the decrypted plaintext increased with the population size and
the number of restarts.
We implemented a variation of Purple called PseudoPurple that has no sixes-twenties
split. Hence, it is less complex but has a larger key space and more powerful than Purple.
We used hidden Markov models to break PseudoPurple by varying the data size and
number of restarts. The results obtained were not very optimistic, however we could
see an improvement in the accuracy of the results by increasing the number of random
restarts.
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Chapter 6
Enhancements and Future Work
We have used hidden Markov models to decipher PseudoPurple, which is more complex
than Purple, in that, it requires a huge amount of effort (large data size and a higher
number of restarts) to perform the cryptanalysis. The hidden Markov model can be
extended to decipher the Purple cipher. Though the complexity of the implementation
will increase, less effort is required to break Purple due to the sixes-twenties split.
The experiments to decipher Purple using genetic algorithms are computationally
intensive and the time complexity can be enhanced by executing it on graphical processing
units (GPUs) using the compute unified device architecture (CUDA) [22]. Mathematically
calculation intensive operations can be executed in parallel with large number of threads
in a kernel or device on the GPU, whereas dependent portions of code can be executed
serially on the CPU.
Finally, we can make use of big data platforms such as Hadoop to run multiple instances
of genetic algorithms and hidden Markov models in parallel on different slave nodes. Each
step of both the approaches can be implemented as Map-Reduce [23] jobs that would
facilitate faster execution for different data sizes and number of restarts.
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Appendix A
Encryption Permutations for Purple
2 1 3 5 4 6
5 4 2 6 3 1
1 5 6 3 2 4
4 3 2 1 6 5
3 6 1 4 5 2
2 1 5 6 4 3
5 4 6 3 2 1
3 6 1 4 5 2
6 3 5 2 1 4
5 4 3 1 2 6
2 1 6 3 4 5
6 5 4 2 1 3
2 3 1 5 6 4
4 2 5 1 3 6
1 3 4 6 5 2
5 6 3 2 1 4
6 2 4 5 3 1
4 1 2 3 5 6
1 2 3 6 4 5
2 5 1 4 6 3
3 4 6 5 2 1
1 5 2 4 6 3
4 6 5 2 3 1
3 4 6 1 5 2
6 2 4 3 1 5
Table A.1: Sixes switch for encryption
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4 7 13 6 17 1 8 11 10 5 16 18 9 3 15 12 20 14 2 19
6 17 9 1 2 18 20 10 19 15 12 13 14 5 8 3 4 11 16 7
2 19 12 17 20 4 13 15 18 11 6 8 3 14 5 9 1 10 7 16
14 9 1 4 13 5 17 7 12 16 15 10 18 2 19 6 11 20 8 3
19 16 10 8 6 2 15 3 20 9 18 14 5 13 12 11 17 7 1 4
20 1 8 18 19 7 5 12 3 13 2 11 10 4 14 15 16 9 6 17
8 10 19 12 11 3 2 17 5 6 13 20 7 16 18 1 9 4 14 15
1 20 14 15 7 12 3 13 16 10 17 5 11 6 9 4 18 8 19 2
9 14 20 17 12 15 7 4 2 18 3 16 19 8 11 10 1 6 13 5
17 13 5 7 10 16 11 2 4 8 20 1 15 9 19 14 3 12 18 6
2 5 13 8 16 17 18 9 7 11 4 19 12 15 10 3 6 14 20 1
18 4 16 2 1 7 12 11 17 14 19 9 5 10 3 8 13 15 6 20
16 6 11 20 17 19 10 8 9 3 7 15 14 12 1 5 2 13 4 18
13 11 4 9 12 8 3 5 14 17 1 2 20 18 6 7 19 16 15 10
10 3 18 5 9 15 4 6 12 20 11 1 17 16 7 2 14 19 8 13
4 17 15 16 18 20 14 1 13 19 6 5 11 8 2 10 7 3 12 9
15 13 2 19 3 14 1 20 11 12 10 17 6 9 16 18 5 4 7 8
12 7 6 3 19 13 16 18 15 1 9 14 2 4 17 20 8 5 10 11
11 12 16 14 15 10 2 19 3 8 13 4 1 7 20 6 18 17 9 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
7 18 12 11 4 20 9 14 1 5 16 3 8 19 10 13 6 15 17 2
5 3 17 18 8 11 6 16 13 7 14 15 4 20 2 19 10 1 9 12
9 16 19 10 7 14 13 20 8 4 5 11 12 17 18 1 15 2 3 6
3 8 10 13 1 9 19 2 6 18 20 7 16 11 4 15 12 17 5 14
19 15 7 3 14 12 18 4 5 2 8 6 20 1 13 17 9 16 11 10
Table A.2: Twenties one switch for encryption
61
3 8 7 18 4 15 20 10 2 9 11 13 16 19 1 14 5 12 6 17
17 4 20 5 11 2 14 7 6 15 12 1 19 18 3 8 10 16 9 13
6 14 18 1 3 17 15 4 16 19 13 7 11 10 8 5 12 2 20 9
14 3 10 19 12 1 6 11 17 13 2 8 20 5 9 18 15 7 16 4
9 2 4 6 17 13 1 18 5 20 14 10 3 8 16 15 7 11 19 12
11 12 14 15 1 19 4 9 6 5 17 16 10 3 20 13 2 18 7 8
18 7 3 2 20 16 19 1 8 11 4 9 6 13 14 10 12 17 5 15
2 17 11 16 10 20 12 6 18 4 8 19 13 7 5 3 14 9 15 1
10 6 17 7 5 12 3 2 1 16 11 20 8 15 4 19 9 14 13 18
17 20 12 13 9 10 16 5 11 1 3 2 15 18 19 6 8 4 14 7
8 16 20 4 13 7 2 19 14 18 1 11 9 3 12 15 17 5 10 6
15 1 2 20 16 14 9 17 3 4 10 12 5 6 7 8 18 13 19 11
4 13 6 9 15 11 10 12 8 2 16 17 7 14 3 1 5 19 18 20
19 10 5 14 18 9 15 20 7 8 13 4 6 12 17 2 11 3 1 16
5 19 17 16 11 8 6 13 12 7 9 3 18 2 10 20 15 1 4 14
20 4 2 5 6 18 16 15 9 10 7 14 17 8 13 12 19 11 3 1
13 5 1 3 8 2 11 16 15 17 18 6 19 4 14 7 20 9 12 10
7 12 19 11 1 14 13 18 4 5 15 10 9 16 2 17 6 20 8 3
12 9 15 8 5 16 17 7 13 18 20 19 3 1 10 11 4 6 14 2
3 18 10 17 7 4 19 1 20 11 2 13 12 6 15 16 9 8 5 14
4 15 11 18 19 3 8 17 10 14 12 5 13 20 6 9 1 16 2 7
1 20 13 12 2 5 10 8 9 15 6 3 14 7 19 18 16 17 11 4
16 14 9 10 8 6 18 2 19 3 5 20 4 17 11 1 13 15 7 12
8 9 16 20 14 12 7 3 13 6 19 15 2 11 18 4 17 10 1 5
2 11 8 6 10 20 5 14 16 12 15 18 1 9 4 7 3 13 17 19
Table A.3: Twenties two switch for encryption
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6 20 4 15 17 8 1 13 14 7 3 10 12 18 19 9 11 16 2 5
9 4 8 12 20 18 14 7 11 13 15 5 6 3 1 17 2 19 10 16
5 1 14 7 19 11 15 18 9 8 2 4 13 10 12 16 20 17 6 3
16 10 2 5 11 7 20 12 4 15 14 3 19 13 17 1 18 9 8 6
18 12 6 4 15 9 13 11 5 14 20 1 8 17 7 3 19 2 16 10
19 13 18 17 3 4 6 5 2 12 15 7 1 9 16 20 8 10 14 11
11 3 13 1 8 15 2 9 18 6 19 12 14 16 4 10 5 20 7 17
12 17 20 3 9 2 19 7 1 4 18 10 15 8 14 6 11 5 16 13
13 14 11 16 1 12 9 10 17 18 7 8 5 2 6 19 4 3 20 15
10 13 5 14 7 16 18 17 3 9 1 6 19 11 8 2 12 4 15 20
7 9 3 18 6 20 16 2 19 10 8 11 17 5 4 12 15 13 1 14
1 8 15 10 11 13 6 16 5 20 12 2 4 7 9 14 3 17 18 19
5 7 1 2 19 14 12 8 16 3 20 4 10 9 15 13 17 6 11 18
17 12 20 6 4 3 11 19 1 5 2 13 9 15 10 18 7 14 8 16
15 18 10 13 17 19 8 1 12 9 16 6 2 3 11 4 14 20 5 7
16 5 19 4 14 9 18 17 15 20 10 8 7 13 3 2 6 1 12 11
2 15 16 11 13 5 3 20 10 17 14 9 6 1 18 7 12 8 19 4
3 6 9 8 12 17 5 10 16 11 4 14 18 20 13 15 1 7 2 19
8 3 12 20 18 6 7 14 13 1 5 19 11 4 2 9 16 15 17 10
20 7 14 9 8 4 10 3 2 16 6 5 17 12 15 11 13 19 18 1
13 19 17 12 16 10 15 4 18 6 1 20 3 8 11 5 14 7 9 2
9 11 10 5 2 14 17 15 20 3 13 18 16 19 7 1 8 6 4 12
7 16 19 10 5 1 13 18 6 2 11 17 15 14 20 4 9 12 3 8
4 18 15 17 3 12 2 1 7 19 9 16 20 6 5 8 10 11 13 14
14 2 7 19 10 13 4 6 8 12 17 15 1 5 16 11 3 18 20 9
Table A.4: Twenties three switch for encryption
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Appendix B
Decryption Permutations for Purple
2 1 3 5 4 6
6 3 5 2 1 4
1 5 4 6 2 3
4 3 2 1 6 5
3 6 1 4 5 2
2 1 6 5 3 4
6 5 4 2 1 3
3 6 1 4 5 2
5 4 2 6 3 1
4 5 3 2 1 6
2 1 4 5 6 3
5 4 6 3 2 1
3 1 2 6 4 5
4 2 5 1 3 6
1 6 2 3 5 4
5 4 3 6 1 2
6 2 5 3 4 1
2 3 4 1 5 6
1 2 3 5 6 4
3 1 6 4 2 5
6 5 1 2 4 3
1 3 6 4 2 5
6 4 5 1 3 2
4 6 1 2 5 3
5 2 4 3 6 1
Table B.1: Sixes switch for decryption [8]
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6 19 14 1 10 4 2 7 13 9 8 16 3 18 15 11 5 12 20 17
4 5 16 17 14 1 20 15 3 8 18 11 12 13 10 19 2 6 9 7
17 1 13 6 15 11 19 12 16 18 10 3 7 14 8 20 4 9 2 5
3 14 20 4 6 16 8 19 2 12 17 9 5 1 11 10 7 13 15 18
19 6 8 20 13 5 18 4 10 3 16 15 14 12 7 2 17 11 1 9
2 11 9 14 7 19 6 3 18 13 12 8 10 15 16 17 20 4 5 1
16 7 6 18 9 10 13 1 17 2 5 4 11 19 20 14 8 15 3 12
1 20 7 16 12 14 5 18 15 10 13 6 8 3 4 9 11 17 19 2
17 9 11 8 20 18 7 14 1 16 15 5 19 2 6 12 4 10 13 3
12 8 17 9 3 20 4 10 14 5 7 18 2 16 13 6 1 19 15 11
20 1 16 11 2 17 9 4 8 15 10 13 3 18 14 5 6 7 12 19
5 4 15 2 13 19 6 16 12 14 8 7 17 10 18 3 9 1 11 20
15 17 10 19 16 2 11 8 9 7 3 14 18 13 12 1 5 20 6 4
11 12 7 3 8 15 16 6 4 20 2 5 1 9 19 18 10 14 17 13
12 16 2 7 4 8 15 19 5 1 11 9 20 17 6 14 13 3 18 10
8 15 18 1 12 11 17 14 20 16 13 19 9 7 3 4 2 5 10 6
7 3 5 18 17 13 19 20 14 11 9 10 2 6 1 15 12 16 4 8
10 13 4 14 18 3 2 17 11 19 20 1 6 12 9 7 15 8 5 16
13 7 9 12 20 16 14 10 19 6 1 2 11 4 5 3 18 17 8 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
9 20 12 5 10 17 1 13 7 15 4 3 16 8 18 11 19 2 14 6
18 15 2 13 1 7 10 5 19 17 6 20 9 11 12 8 3 4 16 14
16 18 19 10 11 20 5 9 1 4 12 13 7 6 17 2 14 15 3 8
5 8 1 15 19 9 12 2 6 3 14 17 4 20 16 13 18 10 7 11
14 10 4 8 9 12 3 11 17 20 19 6 15 5 2 18 16 7 1 13
Table B.2: Twenties one switch for decryption [8]
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15 9 1 5 17 19 3 2 10 8 11 18 12 16 6 13 20 4 14 7
12 6 15 2 4 9 8 16 19 17 5 11 20 7 10 18 1 14 13 3
4 18 5 8 16 1 12 15 20 14 13 17 11 2 7 9 6 3 10 19
6 11 2 20 14 7 18 12 15 3 8 5 10 1 17 19 9 16 4 13
7 2 13 3 9 4 17 14 1 12 18 20 6 11 16 15 5 8 19 10
5 17 14 7 10 9 19 20 8 13 1 2 16 3 4 12 11 18 6 15
8 4 3 11 19 13 2 9 12 16 10 17 14 15 20 6 18 1 7 5
20 1 16 10 15 8 14 11 18 5 3 7 13 17 19 4 2 9 12 6
9 8 7 15 5 2 4 13 17 1 11 6 19 18 14 10 3 20 16 12
10 12 11 18 8 16 20 17 5 6 9 3 4 19 13 7 1 14 15 2
11 7 14 4 18 20 6 1 13 19 12 15 5 9 16 2 17 10 8 3
2 3 9 10 13 14 15 16 7 11 20 12 18 6 1 5 8 17 19 4
16 10 15 1 17 3 13 9 4 7 6 8 2 14 5 11 12 19 18 20
19 16 18 12 3 13 9 10 6 2 17 14 11 4 7 20 15 5 1 8
18 14 12 19 1 7 10 6 11 15 5 9 8 20 17 4 3 13 2 16
20 3 19 2 4 5 11 14 9 10 18 16 15 12 8 7 13 6 17 1
3 6 4 14 2 12 16 5 18 20 7 19 1 15 9 8 10 11 13 17
5 15 20 9 10 17 1 19 13 12 4 2 7 6 11 14 16 8 3 18
14 20 13 17 5 18 8 4 2 15 16 1 9 19 3 6 7 10 12 11
8 11 1 6 19 14 5 18 17 3 10 13 12 20 15 16 4 2 7 9
17 19 6 1 12 15 20 7 16 9 3 11 13 10 2 18 8 4 5 14
1 5 12 20 6 11 14 8 9 7 19 4 3 13 10 17 18 16 15 2
16 8 10 13 11 6 19 5 3 4 15 20 17 2 18 1 14 7 9 12
19 13 8 16 20 10 7 1 2 18 14 6 9 5 12 3 17 15 11 4
13 1 17 15 7 4 16 3 14 5 2 10 18 8 11 9 19 12 20 6
Table B.3: Twenties two switch for decryption [8]
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7 19 11 3 20 1 10 6 16 12 17 13 8 9 4 18 5 14 15 2
15 17 14 2 12 13 8 3 1 19 9 4 10 7 11 20 16 6 18 5
2 11 20 12 1 19 4 10 9 14 6 15 13 3 7 16 18 8 5 17
16 3 12 9 4 20 6 19 18 2 5 8 14 11 10 1 15 17 13 7
12 18 16 4 9 3 15 13 6 20 8 2 7 10 5 19 14 1 17 11
13 9 5 6 8 7 12 17 14 18 20 10 2 19 11 15 4 3 1 16
4 7 2 15 17 10 19 5 8 16 1 12 3 13 6 14 20 9 11 18
9 6 4 10 18 16 8 14 5 12 17 1 20 15 13 19 2 11 7 3
5 14 18 17 13 15 11 12 7 8 3 6 1 2 20 4 9 10 16 19
11 16 9 18 3 12 5 15 10 1 14 17 2 4 19 6 8 7 13 20
19 8 3 15 14 5 1 11 2 10 12 16 18 20 17 7 13 4 9 6
1 12 17 13 9 7 14 2 15 4 5 11 6 16 3 8 18 19 20 10
3 4 10 12 1 18 2 8 14 13 19 7 16 6 15 9 17 20 5 11
9 11 6 5 10 4 17 19 13 15 7 2 12 18 14 20 1 16 8 3
8 13 14 16 19 12 20 7 10 3 15 9 4 17 1 11 5 2 6 18
18 16 15 4 2 17 13 12 6 11 20 19 14 5 9 1 8 7 3 10
14 1 7 20 6 13 16 18 12 9 4 17 5 11 2 3 10 15 19 8
17 19 1 11 7 2 18 4 3 8 10 5 15 12 16 9 6 13 20 14
10 15 2 14 11 6 7 1 16 20 13 3 9 8 18 17 19 5 12 4
20 9 8 6 12 11 2 5 4 7 16 14 17 3 15 10 13 19 18 1
11 20 13 8 16 10 18 14 19 6 15 4 1 17 7 5 3 9 2 12
16 5 10 19 4 18 15 17 1 3 2 20 11 6 8 13 7 12 14 9
6 10 19 16 5 9 1 20 17 4 11 18 7 14 13 2 12 8 3 15
8 7 5 1 15 14 9 16 11 17 18 6 19 20 3 12 4 2 10 13
13 2 17 7 14 8 3 9 20 5 16 10 6 1 12 15 11 18 4 19
Table B.4: Twenties three switch for decryption [8]
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Appendix C
Permutations for PseudoPurple
C.1 Encryption Permutations
6 9 18 8 22 1 11 16 14 7 21 23 13 4 20 17 26 19 2 25 12 15 3 24 5 10
9 23 14 2 3 24 26 15 25 20 17 18 19 7 13 5 6 16 21 11 1 12 8 4 22 10
3 25 16 22 26 6 17 19 23 15 9 12 4 18 8 13 1 14 10 20 5 11 2 21 24 7
19 14 2 6 18 8 22 11 17 21 20 15 24 3 25 9 16 26 12 5 4 13 7 10 1 23
25 22 14 12 9 3 20 5 26 13 24 19 8 18 17 15 23 11 2 7 1 4 6 10 16 21
26 2 12 24 25 10 8 16 4 17 3 15 14 6 19 20 22 13 9 23 5 7 11 1 18 21
11 14 25 16 15 5 3 22 7 9 18 26 10 21 24 1 13 6 19 20 12 2 23 4 8 17
1 25 17 19 10 15 3 16 20 13 21 6 14 7 12 5 22 11 24 2 26 23 9 18 8 4
14 19 26 22 17 20 10 6 3 24 5 21 25 11 16 15 2 9 18 7 8 12 23 1 13 4
22 17 6 9 14 21 15 2 5 10 26 1 20 11 24 18 4 16 23 8 13 3 19 25 7 12
3 8 17 11 20 22 23 12 10 15 7 24 16 19 13 5 9 18 26 1 25 6 2 14 21 4
24 5 21 2 1 10 17 15 22 19 25 13 6 14 4 12 18 20 8 26 9 23 11 16 7 3
21 10 15 26 22 25 14 12 13 5 11 20 19 16 1 9 3 17 6 23 4 8 2 18 24 7
16 14 5 11 15 10 3 6 17 21 1 2 26 23 7 9 24 20 19 12 13 4 22 8 18 25
14 5 24 8 13 19 6 10 16 26 15 2 22 21 11 3 18 25 12 17 7 23 20 4 9 1
6 22 20 21 23 26 18 1 17 25 8 7 15 12 3 14 10 4 16 13 2 9 5 19 24 11
20 18 3 25 5 19 1 26 16 17 15 23 10 14 21 24 7 6 11 12 13 22 4 9 2 8
16 9 8 4 25 17 21 24 20 1 12 18 2 5 22 26 11 7 13 14 3 15 19 6 10 23
15 16 21 19 20 13 3 25 4 11 17 6 1 10 26 8 24 22 12 7 2 9 5 14 18 23
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
11 24 17 15 4 26 13 19 1 5 21 3 12 25 14 18 10 20 23 2 6 7 9 8 16 22
7 5 22 23 10 13 8 20 15 9 17 18 6 26 3 25 12 1 11 14 4 2 16 19 21 24
15 22 25 16 12 20 19 26 13 8 10 17 18 23 24 1 21 4 6 11 5 9 7 14 2 3
4 11 13 17 1 12 24 3 8 23 25 9 20 14 5 19 15 21 7 18 2 16 10 22 6 26
25 21 11 4 20 18 24 8 9 3 14 10 26 1 19 23 15 22 17 16 2 7 13 6 12 5
Table C.1: PseudoPurple encrypt switch
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C.2 Decryption Permutations
6 19 23 14 25 1 10 4 2 26 7 21 13 9 22 8 16 3 18 15 11 5 12 24 20 17
21 4 5 24 16 17 14 23 1 26 20 22 15 3 8 18 11 12 13 10 19 25 2 6 9 7
17 23 1 13 21 6 26 15 11 19 22 12 16 18 10 3 7 14 8 20 24 4 9 25 2 5
25 3 14 21 20 4 23 6 16 24 8 19 22 2 12 17 9 5 1 11 10 7 26 13 15 18
21 19 6 22 8 23 20 13 5 24 18 4 10 3 16 25 15 14 12 7 26 2 17 11 1 9
24 2 11 9 21 14 22 7 19 6 23 3 18 13 12 8 10 25 15 16 26 17 20 4 5 1
16 22 7 24 6 18 9 25 10 13 1 21 17 2 5 4 26 11 19 20 14 8 23 15 3 12
1 20 7 26 16 12 14 25 23 5 18 15 10 13 6 8 3 24 4 9 11 17 22 19 2 21
24 17 9 26 11 8 20 21 18 7 14 22 25 1 16 15 5 19 2 6 12 4 23 10 13 3
12 8 22 17 9 3 25 20 4 10 14 26 21 5 7 18 2 16 23 13 6 1 19 15 24 11
20 23 1 26 16 22 11 2 17 9 4 8 15 24 10 13 3 18 14 5 25 6 7 12 21 19
5 4 26 15 2 13 25 19 21 6 23 16 12 14 8 24 7 17 10 18 3 9 22 1 11 20
15 23 17 21 10 19 26 22 16 2 11 8 9 7 3 14 18 24 13 12 1 5 20 25 6 4
11 12 7 22 3 8 15 24 16 6 4 20 21 2 5 1 9 25 19 18 10 23 14 17 26 13
26 12 16 24 2 7 21 4 25 8 15 19 5 1 11 9 20 17 6 23 14 13 22 3 18 10
8 21 15 18 23 1 12 11 22 17 26 14 20 16 13 19 9 7 24 3 4 2 5 25 10 6
7 25 3 23 5 18 17 26 24 13 19 20 21 14 11 9 10 2 6 1 15 22 12 16 4 8
10 13 21 4 14 24 18 3 2 25 17 11 19 20 22 1 6 12 23 9 7 15 26 8 5 16
13 21 7 9 23 12 20 16 22 14 10 19 6 24 1 2 11 25 4 5 3 18 26 17 8 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
9 20 12 5 10 21 22 24 23 17 1 13 7 15 4 25 3 16 8 18 11 26 19 2 14 6
18 22 15 21 2 13 1 7 10 5 19 17 6 20 9 23 11 12 24 8 25 3 4 26 16 14
16 25 26 18 21 19 23 10 22 11 20 5 9 24 1 4 12 13 7 6 17 2 14 15 3 8
5 21 8 1 15 25 19 9 12 23 2 6 3 14 17 22 4 20 16 13 18 24 10 7 11 26
14 21 10 4 26 24 22 8 9 12 3 25 23 11 17 20 19 6 15 5 2 18 16 7 1 13
Table C.2: PseudoPurple decrypt switch
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